ling--such as memory
and expectation. Thus James says: "Everyone knows the difference between
imagining a thing and believing in its existence, between supposing a
proposition and acquiescing in its truth...IN ITS INNER NATURE, BELIEF,
OR THE SENSE OF REALITY, IS A SORT OF FEELING MORE ALLIED TO THE
EMOTIONS THAN TO ANYTHING ELSE" ("Psychology," vol. ii, p. 283. James's
italics). He proceeds to point out that drunkenness, and, still more,
nitrous-oxide intoxication, will heighten the sense of belief: in the
latter case, he says, a man's very soul may sweat with conviction, and
he be all the time utterly unable to say what he is convinced of. It
would seem that, in such cases, the feeling of belief exists unattached,
without its usual relation to a content believed, just as the feeling
of familiarity may sometimes occur without being related to any definite
familiar object. The feeling of belief, when it occurs in this separated
heightened form, generally leads us to look for a content to which to
attach it. Much of what passes for revelation or mystic insight probably
comes in this way: the belief-feeling, in abnormal strength, attaches
itself, more or less accidentally, to some content which we happen to
think of at the appropriate moment. But this is only a speculation, upon
which I do not wish to lay too much stress.

LECTURE XIII. TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD

The definition of truth and falsehood, which is our topic to-day, lies
strictly outside our general subject, namely the analysis of mind. From
the psychological standpoint, there may be different kinds of belief,
and different degrees of certainty, but there cannot be any purely
psychological means of distinguishing between true and false beliefs.
A belief is rendered true or false by relation to a fact, which may lie
outside the experience of the person entertaining the belief. Truth and
falsehood, except in the case of beliefs about our own minds, depend
upon the relations of mental occurrences to outside things, and thus
take us beyond the analysis of mental occurrences as they are in
themselves. Nevertheless, we can hardly avoid the consideration of truth
and falsehood. We wish to believe that our beliefs, sometimes at least,
yield KNOWLEDGE, and a belief does not yield knowledge unless it is
true. The question whether our minds are instruments of knowledge, and,
if so, in what sense, is so vital that any suggested analysis of mind
must be examined in relati