which we have a right to be
certain that it is invariable. Other judgments of perception are derived
from recognition, as when we say "this is a buttercup," or even merely
"this is yellow." All such judgments entail some risk of error,
though sometimes perhaps a very small one; some flowers that look like
buttercups are marigolds, and colours that some would call yellow others
might call orange. Our subjective certainty is usually a result of
habit, and may lead us astray in circumstances which are unusual in ways
of which we are unaware.

For such reasons, no form of self-evidence seems to afford an absolute
criterion of truth. Nevertheless, it is perhaps true that judgments
having a high degree of subjective certainty are more apt to be true
than other judgments. But if this be the case, it is a result to be
demonstrated, not a premiss from which to start in defining truth and
falsehood. As an initial guarantee, therefore, neither self-evidence nor
subjective certainty can be accepted as adequate.

(2) Coherence.--Coherence as the definition of truth is advocated by
idealists, particularly by those who in the main follow Hegel. It is set
forth ably in Mr. Joachim's book, "The Nature of Truth" (Oxford, 1906).
According to this view, any set of propositions other than the whole
of truth can be condemned on purely logical grounds, as internally
inconsistent; a single proposition, if it is what we should ordinarily
call false, contradicts itself irremediably, while if it is what we
should ordinarily call true, it has implications which compel us to
admit other propositions, which in turn lead to others, and so on, until
we find ourselves committed to the whole of truth. One might illustrate
by a very simple example: if I say "so-and-so is a married man," that
is not a self-subsistent proposition. We cannot logically conceive of a
universe in which this proposition constituted the whole of truth. There
must be also someone who is a married woman, and who is married to
the particular man in question. The view we are considering regards
everything that can be said about any one object as relative in the same
sort of way as "so-and-so is a married man." But everything, according
to this view, is relative, not to one or two other things, but to all
other things, so that from one bit of truth the whole can be inferred.

The fundamental objection to this view is logical, and consists in a
criticism of its doctrine as to relati