o are not distinguished.*

* On the vague and the general cf. Ribot: "Evolution of
General Ideas," Open Court Co., 1899, p. 32: "The sole
permissible formula is this: Intelligence progresses from
the indefinite to the definite. If 'indefinite' is taken as
synonymous with general, it may be said that the particular
does not appear at the outset, but neither does the general
in any exact sense: the vague would be more appropriate. In
other words, no sooner has the intellect progressed beyond
the moment of perception and of its immediate reproduction
in memory, than the generic image makes its appearance, i.e.
a state intermediate between the particular and the general,
participating in the nature of the one and of the other--a
confused simplification."

But we have not yet finished our analysis of the memory-belief. The
tense in the belief that "this occurred" is provided by the nature of
the belief-feeling involved in memory; the word "this," as we have seen,
has a vagueness which we have tried to describe. But we must still ask
what we mean by "occurred." The image is, in one sense, occurring now;
and therefore we must find some other sense in which the past event
occurred but the image does not occur.

There are two distinct questions to be asked: (1) What causes us to say
that a thing occurs? (2) What are we feeling when we say this? As to the
first question, in the crude use of the word, which is what concerns us,
memory-images would not be said to occur; they would not be noticed
in themselves, but merely used as signs of the past event. Images are
"merely imaginary"; they have not, in crude thought, the sort of reality
that belongs to outside bodies. Roughly speaking, "real" things would
be those that can cause sensations, those that have correlations of the
sort that constitute physical objects. A thing is said to be "real"
or to "occur" when it fits into a context of such correlations. The
prototype of our memory-image did fit into a physical context, while
our memory-image does not. This causes us to feel that the prototype was
"real," while the image is "imaginary."

But the answer to our second question, namely as to what we are feeling
when we say a thing "occurs" or is "real," must be somewhat different.
We do not, unless we are unusually reflective, think about the presence
or absence of correlations: we merely have different feelings whic