ristic in question.

In actual fact, there are doubtless various factors that concur in
giving us the feeling of greater or less remoteness in some remembered
event. There may be a specific feeling which could be called the feeling
of "pastness," especially where immediate memory is concerned. But apart
from this, there are other marks. One of these is context. A recent
memory has, usually, more context than a more distant one. When a
remembered event has a remembered context, this may occur in two ways,
either (a) by successive images in the same order as their prototypes,
or (b) by remembering a whole process simultaneously, in the same way in
which a present process may be apprehended, through akoluthic sensations
which, by fading, acquire the mark of just-pastness in an increasing
degree as they fade, and are thus placed in a series while all sensibly
present. It will be context in this second sense, more specially, that
will give us a sense of the nearness or remoteness of a remembered
event.

There is, of course, a difference between knowing the temporal relation
of a remembered event to the present, and knowing the time-order of two
remembered events. Very often our knowledge of the temporal relation
of a remembered event to the present is inferred from its temporal
relations to other remembered events. It would seem that only rather
recent events can be placed at all accurately by means of feelings
giving their temporal relation to the present, but it is clear that such
feelings must play an essential part in the process of dating remembered
events.

We may say, then, that images are regarded by us as more or less
accurate copies of past occurrences because they come to us with two
sorts of feelings: (1) Those that may be called feelings of familiarity;
(2) those that may be collected together as feelings giving a sense of
pastness. The first lead us to trust our memories, the second to assign
places to them in the time-order.

We have now to analyse the memory-belief, as opposed to the
characteristics of images which lead us to base memory-beliefs upon
them.

If we had retained the "subject" or "act" in knowledge, the whole
problem of memory would have been comparatively simple. We could then
have said that remembering is a direct relation between the present act
or subject and the past occurrence remembered: the act of remembering
is present, though its object is past. But the rejection of the subject
r