uaranteed neutral--were that
possible--she could have no cause to object to the French extension.
Our Moorish friends will not listen to our advice; they keep their
country closed, as far as they can, refusing administrative reforms
which would prevent excuses for annexation. Why should we trouble
them? It were better far to come to an agreement with France, and
acknowledge what will prove itself one day--that France is the normal
heir to Morocco whenever the present Empire breaks up."

Unpopular as this opinion was among the British and other foreign
subjects in the country, and especially among the Moors, so that it
had at first no other advocate, it has since been adopted in Downing
Street, and what is of more moment, acted upon. Nay more, Great
Britain has, in return for the mere recognition of a _fait accompli_
in Egypt, agreed to stand aside in Morocco, and to grant France a free
hand in any attempt to create there a similar state of things. Though
the principle was good, the bargain was bad, for the positions of the
two contracting Powers, in Egypt and Morocco respectively, were by no
means analogous. France could never have driven us out of Egypt save
with her sword at our throat; England had but to unite with other
Powers in blocking the way of France in Morocco to stultify all her
plans. Had England stood out for terms, whether as regarding her
commercial interests in Morocco, which have been disgracefully
sacrificed, or in the form of concessions elsewhere, a very much more
equal-handed bargain might have been secured.

The main provisions of the agreement between the two countries,
concluded April 8, 1904, are--

Art. II. "The British Government recognizes that it appertains
to France, more especially as being the Power in contiguity with
Morocco, to control the peace of the country, and to lend its
assistance in all administrative, economical, financial, and
military reforms. The British Government declares that it will not
interfere with the action of France in this regard, provided that
this action will leave intact the rights which, in virtue of
treaties, conventions, and usages, Great Britain enjoys in
Morocco, including the right of coasting between the Morocco
ports, of which English vessels have had the benefit since 1901."

Art. VII. "In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of
Gibraltar, both Governments agree not to allow fortifications