. Neither of the assumptions, however, can be reasonably
maintained.

The assumption of an Infinite Personal God: a Being at once limited and
unlimited, is a use of language to which no mode of human thought can
possibly attach itself. Moreover, the assumption of a God working
miracles is emphatically excluded by universal experience of the order
of nature. The allegation of a specific Divine cause of miracles is
further inadequate from the fact that the power of working miracles is
avowedly not limited to a Personal God, but is also ascribed to other
spiritual Beings, and it must, consequently, always be impossible to
prove that the supposed miraculous phenomena originate with one and not
with the other. On the other hand, the assumption of a Divine design of
Revelation is not suggested by antecedent probability, but is derived
from the very Revelation which it is intended to justify, as is likewise
the assumption of a Personal God, and both are equally vicious as
arguments. The circumstances which are supposed to require this Divine
design, and the details of the scheme, are absolutely incredible and
opposed to all the results of science. Nature does not countenance any
theory of the original perfection and subsequent degradation of the
human race, and the supposition of a frustrated original plan of
creation, and of later impotent endeavours to correct it, is as
inconsistent with Divine omnipotence and wisdom as the proposed
punishment of the human race and the mode devised to save some of them
are opposed to justice and morality. Such assumptions are essentially
inadmissible, and totally fail to explain and justify miracles.

Whatever definition be given of miracles, such exceptional phenomena
must at least be antecedently incredible. In the absence of absolute
knowledge, human belief must be guided by the balance of evidence, and
it is obvious that the evidence for the uniformity of the order of
nature, which is derived from universal experience, must be enormously
greater than can be the testimony for any alleged exception to it. On
the other hand, universal experience prepares us to consider mistakes of
the senses, imperfect observation and erroneous inference as not only
possible, but eminently probable on the part of the witnesses of
phenomena, even when they are perfectly honest and truthful, and more
especially so when such disturbing causes as religious excitement and
superstition are present. When the repo