o magnanimity
to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune."
But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to
magnanimity.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a
man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he
fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of
which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom
of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope.
Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly
regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to
magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.
It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so
is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating
of the passion (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs
indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so
security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes
despair.
Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes
fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of
mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same
as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
Reply Obj. 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one
puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not
fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.
Reply Obj. 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and
participation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, Q. 5, AA.
3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a
condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's
reward.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 8]
Whether Goods of Fortune Conduce to Magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to
magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi):
"virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue
great, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do
not conduce to magnanimity.
Obj. 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But
the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune:
for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists
of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising
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