cy.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that
the "vain man," i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a
presumptuous man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1), magnanimity
observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it
tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to
anything greater than is becoming to us.

Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not
exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he
does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous
man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is
opposed to magnanimity by excess.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin
against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine
justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter
kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it
implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or
rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in
so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability,
it can be opposed to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to
something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man
presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If,
however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption
is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about
ordinary honor, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so
far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err
in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he
has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly,
as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and
worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not make him
so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things without
virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor
are rightly called magnanimous."

Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his
ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the
case of Peter, whose i