ort than evil. Therefore magnanimity is
a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part
thereof.
_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon
magnanimity as a part of fortitude.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 3), a principal
virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of
virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue
is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every
virtue," according to _Ethic._ ii. And this is chiefly commended in
those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most
difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to
stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the
virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.
Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein
fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the
greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as
man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of
death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity
agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult
matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind
about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity
is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as
secondary to principal.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1, 3), "to lack evil
is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous
evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were
the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and
the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity
may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference
as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it
follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.
Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to
all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks
"many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a
magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for
the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that
are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose him
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