itude.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books
of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 126, A. 2), it belongs to a
moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which
it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation
in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as
immoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice,
implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of
daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of
fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above
(Q. 122, A. 3).
Reply Obj. 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend
chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species.
Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same
virtue as presumption which is its cause.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend
on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm
done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition
of daring depend on this.
Reply Obj. 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking the
offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature
inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is
hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the
vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only
timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of
timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring
are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is
present," namely through fear.
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QUESTION 128
OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE
We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider
what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each
part.
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ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 128, Art.]
Whether the Parts of Fortitude Are Suitably Assigned?
Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably
assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to
fortitude, namely _magnificence, confidence, patience,_ and
_perseverance._ Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality;
since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must
needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But
liberality is a part
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