sion is sinful. Again, the
names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess,
thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which
case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is
accounted a sin.
Reply Obj. 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated
by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.
Reply Obj. 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel,
which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking
counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act
rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q. 58,
A. 3). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far
praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues,
as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4, 5, 6). Hence the
names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and
virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the
names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the
case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good
for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 2]
Whether Daring Is Opposed to Fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For
excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But
presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore
daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.
Obj. 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so
far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts
himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with
daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to
injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to
fortitude but to justice.
Obj. 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as
stated above (Q. 123, A. 3). Now since timidity is opposed to
fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice
opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is
opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will
likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring.
But there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be
accounted a vice in opposition to fort
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