untries on rich and weak countries;
wars like our wars of the Revolution, and with Mexico, our War
of the Rebellion, and our Spanish War, and many others in which
various nations have engaged. The causes of many wars have been
so numerous and so complex that the true cause is hard to state;
but it may be stated in general that wars in which countries that
were both rich and strong, as Great Britain and France are now,
have deliberately initiated an aggressive war are few and far apart.
The reason seems to be that countries which are rich tend to become
not militaristic and aggressive, but effeminate and pacific. The
access of luxury, the refinements of living that the useful and
the delightful arts produce, and the influence of women, tend to
wean men from the hardships of military life, and to engender a
distaste for the confusion, bloodshed, and "horrors" of war. For
this reason, the rich countries have shown little tendency to
aggression, but a very considerable tendency to invite aggression.
Physical fighting among nations bears some resemblance to physical
fighting among men, in that rich nations and rich men are apt to
abstain from it, unless they are attacked; or unless they think
they are attacked, or will be. The fact of being rich has the double
influence of removing a great inducement to go to war, and of causing
a distaste for it.

For all of the reasons given above, it would seem advisable when
making an "estimate of the situation," in preparation for war,
to estimate it as gravely as reasonable probability will permit.
The tendency of human nature is to estimate it too lightly; but
in matters of possible war, "madness lies that way."

This seems to mean that in preparing plans for additions to the
fleet for war, we should estimate for the worst condition that
is reasonably probable. In the United States, this means that we
should estimate for a sudden attack by a powerful fleet on our
Atlantic coast; and, as such an attack would occasion a tremendous
temptation to any foe in Asia to make a simultaneous attack in
the Pacific, we must estimate also for sending a large fleet at
the same time on a cruise across the Pacific Ocean.

This clearly means that our estimate must include putting into
the Atlantic and Pacific all the naval vessels that we have, fully
manned with fully drilled crews; and adding besides all the vessels
from civil life that will be needed. The vessels taken from civil
life will be mo