er_, the
_Englishman_, and the _Eagle Point_, which vessels had Americans on
board, the German note professed to be unable to say whether the
first-named ship was attacked by a German submarine, but in the case
of the two last-named they were attacked after attempting to escape
and disregarding signals to stop.
The communication made the worst of impressions on the Washington
Government. The clumsy prevarication of attempting to show that a
steamer other than the _Sussex_ had been torpedoed in the belief that
it was a war vessel merely sufficed to complete the accumulating
circumstantial evidence in the possession of the Government that the
_Sussex_ had been torpedoed by a German submarine without warning in
violation of an express pledge. The Administration had become weary of
Germany's protestations of innocence and good behavior, and of shallow
excuses for breaking her word, and had lost faith in any German
utterance. The cabinet view of the situation, as expressed at a
meeting called the day following the receipt of the German note, was
that a nation which would accept perjured affidavits as a basis for a
note charging that the _Lusitania_ was armed would not hesitate to
enter a blanket denial of any act if perpetrated.
The tension created by Germany's unconvincing alibi caused alarm in
Berlin, and government officials were reported as showing a nervous
anxiety to strain every nerve to avoid a rupture with the United
States. A loophole had been provided in the German note for a possible
withdrawal of her denial of responsibility for the destruction of the
_Sussex_ as will be seen from this passage:
"Should the American Government have at its disposal further material
for a conclusion upon the case of the _Sussex_ the German Government
would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material
also to an investigation."
This saving clause gave the German note the aspect of a preliminary to
the usual backdown and to an admission of liability, with the
palliating excuse of ignorance of the vessel's identity. At any rate
signs were not wanting that Germany recognized, had she had a choice
to make, with the American Government reenforced with clinching
testimony, to be duly presented, that a German submarine and none
other torpedoed the _Sussex_ and jeopardized the lives of twenty-five
Americans on board.
On April 19, 1916, President Wilson had the issue with Germany before
Congress and addressed th
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