ho at St. Mihiel blocked the north and south line
from the Paris-Nancy trunk line and at Montfaucon and Varennes
interrupted the Paris-Verdun railroad by indirect fire.

There was every reason why the Germans could expect that a sudden and
terrific blow would permit them to get to Verdun, take the forts on
the east bank, and possibly cut clear through the French lines and
break them into two parts. Not impossibly this would mean retirement
as far as the old Marne battle field: certainly it would mean the
extinction of French hope. So the Germans reasoned.

The first blow fell on February 21, 1916. The initial attack was made
east of the Meuse on a very narrow front; it resulted in an immediate
local success. The French trenches were abolished, the French line was
threatened, and the German army overflowed south in great force. The
possibility of a repetition of the Dunajec success was at this time
plain.

Worst of all, from the allied point of view, there now came a
difference in opinion between the French General Staff and the French
Civil Government. The former wished to retire behind the Meuse and
evacuate the eastern forts and trenches, thereby gaining a strong
defensive line, but surrendering Verdun. The Government felt that such
a retreat would be accepted as a grave disaster, would depress the
French people, and result in a political overturn.

At the outset the general staff seems to have adhered to its view, and
for some days the German advance was steady. Even Fort Douaumont, on
the outer rim of the old permanent fortifications, was lost, and the
German press announced the fall of the city itself. But in the end the
army listened to the Government, Castelnau and Petain went to the
front to organize the defense. By the middle of March the first crisis
was about over and the French had restored their line, the most
expensive detail in their defense. But they had not been able to
retake Douaumont, and German possession was to prove a thorn in their
side thenceforth.

With the great general attack of April 9, 1916, the first phase of the
battle for Verdun was over. This check abolished all chance of a
piercing of the French lines, of a second Dunajec. It assured to the
French time to complete their second- and third-line defenses, and it
gave ample evidence that the dangers of the first hours, due to
failures and errors which cost many generals their positions, were at
an end. Above all, it demonstrated that