me edge of the hills, on the east bank of the Meuse, and the
French were just holding the inside line of forts--Belleville,
Souville, and Tavannes--with their backs to the river and with German
trenches coming right up to the ditches of these three forts.

By July 1, 1915, the French were in their last ditch before
Verdun--that is, on the east bank--but on July 1, 1916, there began
that allied offensive at the Somme which changed the whole face of the
western operations. Thus, by August 1, 1916, the Germans had been
compelled to remove many troops from Verdun and the French were able
to take the offensive here again, and by August 6, 1916, had made
material progress in retaking portions of the ground they had "sold"
the Germans for so great a price in previous weeks.

GETTYSBURG

After the German checks in April the French compared the Verdun fight
to Gettysburg. General Delacroix used that example to me in March, but
it was not until June that General Joffre was ready to adopt it. By
this time it was well established in all minds. Gettysburg had been
the final effort of the South to win a decision on the field while
superior organization gave her advantage over a foe that had
superiority in ultimate resources, both of money and men. The failure
at Gettysburg was promptly followed by the loss of the initiative, the
North passed to the attack, and the rest of the war consisted in the
steady wearing out of the Confederacy.

A victory at Gettysburg would probably have won the Civil War for the
South. A victory of the Dunajec style might have won the Great War for
the Germans. But the victory did not come, the struggle went on for
many months, and presently the consequence of stripping the eastern
lines was disclosed in new Russian victories, while the absolute
failure to provoke a premature offensive in the west, or prevent any
offensive, was disclosed in the Battle of the Somme.

Verdun, then, was the third failure of Germany to win the war by a
major thrust. It was a failure which was wholly similar to the
failures at the Marne and in Russia. Relatively speaking, it was a far
greater failure, because it brought no incidental profit as did the
other campaigns: it won only a few square miles of storm-swept hills,
it has cost not less than 250,000 casualties, and allied statements
placed the cost at half a million. From the military, the moral, the
political points of view, Verdun was a defeat for the Germans of the