llies are
everywhere on the defensive, and everywhere they have been and are
ceding ground. Their enemies, imperfectly prepared two years ago, are
now the rivals of Germany in preparation; England has millions of men
where she had hundreds of thousands in August, 1914; France and
Britain both have heavy artillery, and Russia is demonstrating her
wealth of munitions and her resources in men. Such is the great
transition that has come as the third year of the Great War begins.

Conceivably, Germany may still be able to forge a new thunderbolt, to
pass to the offensive again, and win the war; conceivably she can hold
her present lines until the fury of the Allies abates and losses and
economic strain impose a drawn battle and a peace without victory for
any contestant. But all these considerations are for the future. What
it is now important to recognize is that the three great efforts of
Germany to win the war in the Napoleonic fashion have failed. She has
had neither an Austerlitz, a Jena, nor a Friedland. She has instead
the Marne, Verdun, and the Russian failure. She has failed to
eliminate any one of her great foes as Napoleon eliminated, first
Austria, then Prussia, and then Russia. She has failed to win the war
while she had superior numbers, incomparably greater resources in
equipment, and unrivaled supremacy in artillery. She is outnumbered,
outgunned, and her foes control the sea and possess vastly greater
resources in money than she can boast.

The parallel of Napoleon before Leipzig, of the Confederacy after
Gettysburg, is in many men's minds to-day. But it is for the future to
disclose whether the parallel be true or false. What is clear as the
third year of the war opens is that all three of Germany's major
conceptions have gone wrong; all three of her great campaigns have
failed to accomplish their main purpose, and that, as a consequence,
Germany is now on the defensive on all fronts for the first time in
the war.

A moment ago I mentioned Bernhardi's words. Perhaps they will serve as
the best comment with which to close this review. The quotation is
from his book, "On War of To-day":

"If at some future time Germany is involved in the slowly threatening
war, she need not recoil before the numerical superiority of her
enemies. But so far as human nature is able to tell, she can only rely
on being successful if she is resolutely determined to break the
superiority of her enemies by a victory over one or