urgent. She reckoned
that Russia would be incapable of a real offensive in 1916; she
reckoned that Britain would not be able to train her armies for
effective action in the same year, and she gambled on the probability
that her blows at Verdun would dispose of France. In addition, she
reckoned the Austrian attack upon Italy would dispose of Italian
threats for the summer.

But long before the war Bernhardi had foretold a German defeat in her
next conflict if all her foes were able to get their forces into the
field at one time, and Germany should fail to dispose of at least one
of her enemies before all were ready. It is not the time or the place
to assert that what Bernhardi forecast has now come true, but it is
clear that Germany, temporarily or permanently, as it may prove, lost
the initiative following her defeat at Verdun, that she was compelled
to accept the defensive on all fronts by July, and that up to the date
this article is written, August 8, 1916, she has been losing ground on
all fronts.

THE RUSSIAN ATTACK

Very briefly, now, in the remaining space allowed me, I purpose to
discuss the remarkable change in the whole face of the war that had
come by the second anniversary of the outbreak of the conflict. The
first authentic sign of this change was the great Russian success in
Volhynia and Galicia about June 1, 1916. (Vol. V, 154.) As far back as
February Russian successes in Asia Minor had suggested that the
Russian army was regaining power and receiving adequate munitions. The
captures of Erzerum and Trebizond were a warning that deserved, but
did not earn, attention in Berlin and the British failure and
surrender at Kut-el-Amara served to obscure the Eastern situation.
(Vol. V, 318-326.)

[Illustration: The Russian Spring Offensive, 1916. Shaded section
shows ground gained, June to September.]

But about June 1, 1916, Russia suddenly stepped out and assailed the
whole Austro-German line with fire and steel. The weight of the blow
fell between the Pripet Marshes and the Rumanian frontier. From this
front Germany had drawn many troops to aid in her Verdun operation,
Austria had made similar drafts to swell her forces attacking Italy.
Too late Berlin and Vienna realized that they had weakened their line
beyond the danger point and had hopelessly underestimated the
recuperative power of the Slav.

By July 1, 1916, the magnitude of the Russian success was no longer
hidden from German or Austrian. A