Apparently the German reasoning was
this: Britain was not yet ready, winter and defeat had reduced the
value of Russia so low that it was safe to turn the best of their
troops from the east to the west. Actually the whole weight of the
military machine could be exerted against France.
From this second blow at France the Germans expected to derive the
benefits missed at the Marne. If the French lines were broken, as the
Russian had been at the Dunajec, then a wide swinging advance would
carry German troops deep into the French territory, end French hope
and compel French surrender. This was the maximum of possibility.
On the other hand, if there were no actual and deep piercing of the
French lines, the pressure upon the French would lead them to call
upon the British for help. British attack, while the British force was
still unready, would lead to great losses and would exhaust the
reserves in men and munitions of both France and Britain. At the worst
this would mean that neither France nor Britain would be ready to take
the field in their long-promised general offensive in 1916.
There was, of course, the possibility that the German attack would be
repulsed, that the French and British would not undertake a premature
offensive, and that Russia would rally and be able to storm the
eastern lines stripped of reserves to strengthen the western attack.
If all these things happened then Germany might herself lose the
offensive and conceivably the war. But no German soldier could believe
these things would happen and the remote possibility did not weigh
against the apparent opportunity to win a sweeping and decisive
victory, while the British and Russians were still unready and France
alone in the field.
THE FEBRUARY ATTACK
Accordingly Germany decided to attack in the west. She selected Verdun
as the objective for reasons not at first clear but now well known.
Verdun was in the public mind a great fortress, surrounded by
impregnable works, the strongest point on the French front. In fact it
was the weakest sector. The forts had been evacuated, the first line
defenses some miles north of the town were strong, but the second and
third had been neglected. The line was held by less than two army
corps of territorials; there were other faults in preparation
chargeable to the politicians. Worst of all of these was the lack of
rail communications due to failure to build new lines to replace those
cut by the Germans, w
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