ly considerable
consequence of the Allied attack, preparation for which had consumed
many months. Again it was demonstrated that England was not ready and
France, alone, could not free her own territory.

ITALY

Italy had entered the war just as Russia was suffering her first
terrible defeats in Galicia. (Vol. III, 382-392.) Had Italian decision
been reached a few months earlier the effect might have been decisive.
As it was, Italy came too late, her attack was halted south of Trent
and along the Isonzo, after inconsiderable progress. A certain number
of Austrian divisions, which conceivably might have been directed
against Russia and contributed to making the outcome of that campaign
decisive, were drawn off to the south. (Vol. III, 392-402.)

In September, and again when the Austro-German attack upon Serbia was
at its height, Italy attacked along the Isonzo. (Vol. IV, 415-417.)
Once more the result was limited to drawing off certain divisions, a
useful but not highly important service. In opening another front
Italy had contributed to the further consumption of the reserves of
the Central Powers, she had begun an operation to be compared with
that of Britain in Spain in the later days of the First Empire. She
was taking off a portion of the weight that France and Russia were
carrying, she was contributing to the exhaustion of Austria, but
neither in the first nor the second year of the war was the
contribution to be considerable and Italy was presently to require aid
from Russia, when at last Austria decided to pass to the offensive in
the Trentino.

VERDUN

With the coming of winter the German General Staff had to face a new
situation, full of menace. Their first great conception, the
destruction of the military power of France, had failed, although it
had won much territory and provided an admirable defensive position
far beyond their own frontiers. Their second major conception, the
elimination of Russia from the war, had failed, but it had also given
them much territory and they were not overoptimistic in assuming that
their victories would keep Russia on the defensive for many months;
their actual mistake, it turned out, was in overestimating the length
of time.

Again, then, there was offered the original choice: Should the next
blow be postponed until spring and directed at Petrograd or Moscow, or
should it be prepared and delivered before spring and in the west? The
decision for the west was made.