suggestion
that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of
the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the
slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other
government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants.
Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not
relative."
Secretary Lansing, in a comment on this reply, said the German note
was devoted to matters which the American Government could not discuss
with the German Government. He took the ground, as the American reply
indicated, that the only "questions of right" which could be discussed
with the German Government were those arising out of German or
American action exclusively, not out of those questions which were the
subject of diplomatic exchanges between the United States and any
other country.
"So long as she (Germany) lives up to this altered policy," he
explained, "we can have no reason to quarrel with her on that score,
though the losses resulting from the violation of American rights by
German submarine commanders operating under the former policy will
have to be settled.
"While our differences with Great Britain cannot form a subject of
discussion with Germany, it should be stated that in our dealings with
the British Government we are acting, as we are unquestionably bound
to act, in view of the explicit treaty engagements with that
Government. We have treaty obligations as to the manner in which
matters in dispute between the two Governments are to be handled. We
offered to assume mutually similar obligations with Germany, but the
offer was declined."
Mr. Lansing's comment appeared to be more enlightening to German
opinion than the official communication. But while the German was
frankly puzzled by the American contention--holding that there was an
intimate connection between England's "illegal blockade policy" and
the submarine war--and wondered naively whether or not he was the
simple victim of an American confidence game, or strongly suspected
that he had been hoodwinked by President Wilson into parting with the
effective submarine weapon, with no guarantee of getting any action
against England in return, hard German common sense discerned through
these doubts, and made the most of the one all-important fact it could
comprehend--that the dreaded break had been avoided.
With the air thus cleared, the usual anticlimax came to the
situation--the tumbling do
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