gh, and that such a life as the world has seldom seen.

In the meantime the private Christian may well be content with what he
has. 'If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine whether
it be of God.'

CHAPTER XIV.

CONCLUSION.

And now that we have come to the end of the purely critical
portion of this enquiry, I may perhaps be allowed to say a few
words on its general tendency and bearing. As critics we have only
the critical question to deal with. Certain evidence is presented
to us which it is our duty to weigh and test by reference to
logical and critical laws. It must stand or fall on its own
merits, and any considerations brought in from without will be
irrelevant to the question at issue. But after this is done we may
fairly look round and consider how our conclusion affects other
conclusions and in what direction it is leading us. If we look at
'Supernatural Religion' in this way we shall see that its tendency
is distinctly marked. Its attack will fall chiefly upon the middle
party in opinion. And it will play into the hands of the two
extreme parties on either side. There can be little doubt that
indirectly it will help the movement that is carrying so many into
Ultramontanism, and directly it is of course intended to win
converts to what may perhaps be called comprehensively Secularism.

Now it is certainly true that the argument from consequences is
one that ought to be applied with great caution. Yet I am not at
all sure that it has not a real basis in philosophy as well as in
nature. The very existence of these two great parties, the
Ultramontane and the Secularist, over against each other, seems to
be it kind of standing protest against either of them. If
Ultramontanism is true, how is it that so many wise and good men
openly avow Secularism? If 'Secularism is true, how is it that so
many of the finest and highest minds take refuge from it--a
treacherous refuge, I allow--in Ultramontanism? There is
something in this more than a mere defective syllogism--more than
an insufficient presentation of the evidence. Truth, in the widest
sense, is that which is in accordance with the laws and conditions
of human nature. But where beliefs are so directly antithetical as
they are here, the repugnance and resistance which each is found
to cause in so large a number of minds is in itself a proof that
those laws and conditions are insufficiently complied with. To the
spectator, standing