FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207  
208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232   >>   >|  
of it, can afford us such propositions. But these are so few, and of so little moment, that we may justly look on our certain general knowledge of substances as almost none at all. 16. Wherein lies the general Certainty of Propositions. To conclude: general propositions, of what kind soever, are then only capable of certainty, when the terms used in them stand for such ideas, whose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed, is capable to be discovered by us. And we are then certain of their truth or falsehood, when we perceive the ideas the terms stand for to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another. Whence we may take notice, that general certainty is never to be found but in our ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere, in experiment or observations without us, our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to afford us general knowledge. CHAPTER VII. OF MAXIMS 1. Maxims or Axioms are Self-evident Propositions. THERE are a sort of propositions, which, under the name of MAXIMS and AXIOMS, have passed for principles of science: and because they are SELF-EVIDENT, have been supposed innate, without that anybody (that I know) ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It may, however, be worth while to inquire into the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone; and also to examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge. 2. Where in that Self-evidence consists. Knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Now, where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be so to any who will but consider any of those propositions which, without any proof, he assents to at first sight: for in all of them he will find that the reason of his assent is from that agreement or disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the proposition. 3. Self evidence not peculiar to received Axioms. This being so, in the next place, let us consider whether this self-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions which commonly pass under the name of maxims, and have the dignity
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204   205   206   207  
208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
general
 

knowledge

 

propositions

 
evidence
 
agreement
 
disagreement
 

peculiar

 

reason

 

MAXIMS

 

consists


Axioms
 
capable
 

afford

 

Propositions

 

certainty

 

evident

 

foundation

 

cogency

 

clearness

 

Knowledge


examine
 

inquire

 

govern

 
influence
 

negation

 
proposition
 
affirmation
 

answering

 

comparing

 

received


maxims

 

dignity

 
commonly
 
intervention
 

immediately

 
perceived
 

assent

 

assents

 

perception

 

CHAPTER


expressed

 

discovered

 
soever
 

falsehood

 
Whence
 
denied
 

affirmed

 

perceive

 
conclude
 

moment