ue of Nations would obviate the necessity of
the strategic protection asked for.

The struggle over these issues nearly broke the back of the Conference.
If Clemenceau had yielded in January when the League was demanded by
Wilson, it was with the mental reservation that when the "practical"
issues came up, the victory should be his. The French press were not slow
to give support to their Government, and within a short time the
President, so recently a popular idol, found himself anathematized as a
pro-German and the sole obstacle to a speedy and satisfactory peace. The
more noisy section of the British press followed suit. Liberals were
silenced and American idealism was cursed as meddlesome myopia. For some
days the deadlock appeared interminable and likely to become fatal. In a
contest of obstinacy even Wilson could be matched by Clemenceau. The
increasing bitterness of French attacks upon the Americans began to tell
upon Wilson; for the first time his physical strength seemed likely to
collapse under the strain. Matters were brought to a head by a bold
stroke, on the 7th of April, when Wilson ordered the _George Washington_
to sail for Brest. The inference was plain: the President would leave the
Conference unless the Allies abated their claims.

The week of strain was followed by one of adjustment. Fearing an open
break with America, Allied leaders showed themselves anxious to find a
compromise, and Wilson himself was willing to meet them part way, since
he realized that without France and England his new international system
could never operate. Colonel House found opportunity for his tested skill
and common sense as a mediator, and he was assisted by Tardieu, who
proved himself to be fertile in suggestions for a practical middle
course. As in the case of all compromises, the solutions satisfied no one
completely. But clearly some sort of treaty had to be framed, if the
world were to resume normal life and if the spread of social revolution
were to be checked. At least the compromises had the virtue of winning
unanimity, without which Europe could not be saved.

The indemnity problem was settled, at least for the moment, by postponing
a final definite statement of the total amount that Germany must pay. It
was decided that the sum of five billion dollars (twenty billion gold
marks), in cash or kind, should be demanded from Germany as an initial
payment, to be made before May 1, 1921. Certain abatements were to be