venturous course of action which could not be controlled
by Congress. The chief opposition to the treaty and covenant, however,
probably resulted from the personal dislike of Wilson. This feeling, which
had always been virulent along the Atlantic coast and in the industrial
centers of the Middle West, had been intensified by the President's
apparent disregard of Congress. More than one man of business argued that
the treaty must be bad because it was Wilson's work and the covenant worst
of all, since it was his pet scheme. One heard daily in the clubs and on
the golf-courses of New England and the Middle Atlantic States the remark:
"I know little about the treaty, but I know Wilson, and I know he must be
wrong."
And yet the game was probably in the President's hands, had he known how
to play it. Divided as it was on the question of personal devotion to
Wilson, the country was a unit in its desire for immediate peace and
normal conditions. Admitting the imperfections of the treaty, it was
probably the best that could be secured in view of the conflicting
interests of the thirty-one signatory powers, and at least it would bring
peace at once. To cast it aside meant long delays and prolongation of the
economic crisis. The covenant of the League might not be entirely
satisfactory, but something must be done to prevent war in the future;
and if this League proved unsatisfactory, it could be amended after
trial. Even the opposing Senators did not believe that they could defeat
the treaty outright. They were warned by Republican financiers, who
understood international economic conditions, that the safety and
prosperity of the world demanded ratification, and that the United States
could not afford to assume an attitude of isolation even if it were
possible. Broad-minded statesmen who were able to dissociate partisan
emotion from intellectual judgment, such as ex-President Taft, agreed
that the treaty should be ratified as promptly as possible. All that
Senator Lodge and his associates really hoped for was to incorporate
reservations which would guarantee the independence of American action
and incidentally make it impossible for the President to claim all the
credit for the peace.
Had the President proved capable of cooeperating with the moderate
Republican Senators it would probably have been possible for him to have
saved the fruits of his labor at Paris. An important group honestly
believed that the language of the cove
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