hich they had nourished
during the bitterness of the struggle. The moment had arrived when
practical advantage might be taken from the defeat of the enemy, and it
seemed madness to surrender such advantage for the sake of quixotic
ideals. The statesmen of Europe once more viewed affairs through the
colored prism of national selfishness. In America, where Wilsonian ideals
had at best been imperfectly appreciated, men were wearied by
international problems and longed for a return to the simple complexity of
the business life which they understood. The President was confronted by a
double problem. He must win from Europe acceptance of his programme,
crystallized in the League of Nations; from his fellow countrymen he must
secure the support necessary if the United States were to continue to play
the role in world affairs which she had undertaken during the war, and
which alone would make possible an effective League of Nations. To meet
the difficulties of the task, President Wilson was imperfectly equipped.
He lacked the dynamic qualities of a Roosevelt, which might have enabled
him to carry his opponents off their feet by an overwhelming rush; he was
not endowed with the tactical genius of a skillful negotiator; he was,
above all, handicapped by the personal hostilities which he had aroused at
home.

In Europe the President achieved at least partial success. He proved
unable to marshal the forces of liberalism in such a way as to carry his
complete programme to victory, and the sacrifices which he made to the
spirit of selfish nationalism cost him the support and the confidence of
many progressive elements, while they did not placate the hostility of
the reactionaries. But he secured the League of Nations, the symbol and
the instrument of the new international organization which he sought.
Thereby at least a beginning was made in concrete form, which might later
be developed, when the force of the post-bellum reaction had wasted
itself.

At home, however, the forces of opposition proved strong enough to rob
the President of what might have been a triumph. He lacked the capacity
to reconcile his personal and political opponents, as well as the ability
to compromise with the elements that were inclined to meet him half-way.
In accordance with his basic principles he appealed from the politicians
to the people. But here again he failed, whether because of personal
unpopularity, or because of the poor publicity which had bee