nant was ambiguous in certain
respects, particularly as regards the extent of sovereignty sacrificed
by the national government to the League, and the diminution of
congressional powers. This group was anxious to insert reservations
making plain the right of Congress alone to declare war, defining more
exactly the right of the United States to interpret the Monroe Doctrine,
and specifying what was meant by domestic questions that should be exempt
from the cognizance of the League. Had Wilson at once combined with this
group and agreed to the suggested reservations, he would in all
probability have been able to secure the two-thirds vote necessary to
ratification. The country would have been satisfied; the Republicans
might have contended that they had "Americanized" the treaty; and the
reservations would probably have been accepted by the co-signatories. It
would have been humiliating to go back to the Allies asking special
privileges, but Europe needed American assistance too much to fail to
heed these demands. After all America had gained nothing in the way of
territorial advantage from the war and was asking for nothing in the way
of reparations.

It was at this crucial moment that Wilson's peculiar temperamental faults
asserted themselves. Sorely he needed the sane advice of Colonel House,
who would doubtless have found ways of placating the opposition. But that
practical statesman was in London and the President lacked the capacity
to arrange the compromise that House approved.

President Wilson alone either would not or could not negotiate
successfully with the middle group of Republicans. He went so far as to
initiate private conferences with various Senators, a step indicating his
desire to avoid the appearance of the dictatorship of which he was
accused; but his attitude on reservations that altered the meaning of any
portion of the treaty or covenant was unyielding, and he even insisted
that merely interpretative reservations should not be embodied in the
text of the ratifying resolution. The President evidently hoped that the
pressure of public opinion would compel the Senate to yield to the demand
for immediate peace and for guarantees against future war. His appearance
of rigidity, however, played into the hands of the opponents of the
treaty, who dominated the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.
Senator Lodge, chairman of the committee, adopted a stand which, to the
Administration at least, did not