matter
which he had held closest to his heart, the President embarked upon the
_George Washington_ on the 29th of June, the day after the signing of the
treaty, and set forth for home. All that was now needed was the
ratification of the treaty by the Senate.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SENATE AND THE TREATY

Neither President Wilson nor those who had been working with him at Paris
seriously feared that, after securing the point of chief importance to
him at the Conference, he would fail to win support for the League of
Nations and the treaty at home. They recognized, of course, that his
political opponents in the Senate would not acquiesce without a struggle.
The Republicans were now in the majority, and Henry Cabot Lodge, the new
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, had gone far in his
efforts to undermine Wilson's policy at Paris. He had encouraged the
Italians in their imperialistic designs in the Adriatic and had done his
best to discredit the League of Nations. Former Progressive Senators,
such as Johnson and Borah, who like Lodge made personal hostility to
Wilson the chief plank in their political programme, had declared
vigorously their determination to prevent the entrance of the United
States into a League. The Senators as a whole were not well-informed upon
foreign conditions and Wilson had done nothing to enlighten them. He had
not asked their advice in the formulation of his policy, nor had he
supplied them with the facts that justified the position he had taken.
Naturally their attitude was not likely to be friendly, now that he
returned to request their consent to the treaty, and the approach of a
presidential election was bound to affect the action of all ardent
partisans.

Opposition was also to be expected in the country. There was always the
ancient prejudice against participation in European affairs, which had not
been broken even by the events of the past two years. The people, even
more than the Senate, were ignorant of foreign conditions and failed to
understand the character of the obligations which the nation would assume
under the treaty and the covenant of the League. There was genuine fear
lest the United States should become involved in wars and squabbles in
which it had no material interest, and lest it should surrender its
independence of action to a council of foreign powers. This was
accompanied by the belief that an irresponsible President might commit the
country to an ad