permitted the Germans, since this sum was to include the expenses of the
army of occupation, which were reckoned as in the neighborhood of a
billion dollars; and supplies of food and raw materials, which Germany
might need to purchase, could be paid for out of that sum. In the second
place, Germany was required to deliver interest-bearing bonds to a further
amount of ten billions; and, if the initial payment of cash fell short of
five billions by reason of permitted deductions, the amount of bonds was
to be so increased as to bring the total payments in cash, kind, or bonds,
up to fifteen billions by May 1, 1921. If a Reparations Commission, the
decisions of which Germany must agree to accept, should be satisfied that
more yet could be paid, a third issue of bonds, amounting to a further ten
billions might be exacted. Even this total of twenty-five billions was not
to be regarded as final, if Germany's capacity to pay more were determined
by the Reparations Commission. Germany was required to acknowledge full
liability, and the total sum which she might theoretically have to pay was
reckoned by a British expert as between thirty-two and forty-four
billions. The Reparations Commission, however, was given the power to
recommend abatements as well as increased payments; upon the wisdom of its
members the practical application of the treaty would obviously
depend.[14]

[Footnote 14: The proposal of a permanent commission for handling the
whole matter of reparations was made first by an American financial
adviser, John Foster Dulles. The idea was accepted by Lloyd George and
Clemenceau as an efficacious method of enabling them to postpone the
decision of a definite sum to be paid by Germany until the political
situation in France and Great Britain should be more favorable.]

In truth the reparations clauses of the treaty, which compelled Germany
to hand over what was practically a blank check to the Allies,
represented no victory for Wilson. But he had at least prevented the
imposition of the crushing indemnities that had been proposed, and which
must have been followed by political and economic consequences hardly
short of disastrous. As for the eastern frontier of France, it was agreed
that the right of property in the coal mines of the Saar district should
be given outright to France, as partial but immediate compensation for
the damage done at Lens and elsewhere. But the district itself was to be
placed under the League