lly inconsistent
therewith.
Chapter IV. The Moral World Not Constituted According To The Scheme Of
Necessity.
Section I. The scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology.
Section II. The scheme of necessity is directed against a false
issue.
Section III. The scheme of necessity is supported by false logic.
Section IV. The scheme of necessity is fortified by false
conceptions.
Section V. The scheme of necessity is recommended by false
analogies.
Section VI. The scheme of necessity is rendered plausible by a false
phraseology.
Section VII. The scheme of necessity originates in a false method,
and terminates in a false religion.
Chapter V. The Relation Between The Human Will And The Divine Agency.
Section I. General view of the relation between the divine and the
human power.
Section II. The Pelagian platform, or view of the relation between
the divine and the human power.
Section III. The Augustinian Platform, or view of the relation
between the divine agency and the human.
Section IV. The views of those who, in later times, have symbolized
with Augustine.
Section V. The danger of mistaking distorted for exalted views of
the divine sovereignty.
Chapter VI. The Existence Of Moral Evil, Or Sin, Reconciled With The
Holiness Of God.
Section I. The hypothesis of the soul's preexistence.
Section II. The hypothesis of the Manicheans.
Section III. The hypothesis of optimism.
Section IV. The argument of the atheist--The reply of Leibnitz and
other theists--The insufficiency of this reply.
Section V. The sophism of the atheist exploded, and a perfect
agreement shown to subsist between the existence of sin and the
holiness of God.
Section VI. The true and only foundation of optimism.
Section VII. The glory of God seen in the creation of a world, which
he foresaw would fall under the dominion of sin.
Section VIII. The little, captious spirit of Voltaire, and other
atheizing minute philosophers.
Chapter VII. Objections Considered.
Section I. It may be objected that the foregoing scheme is "new
theology."
Section II. It may be imagined that the views herein set forth limit
the omnipotence of God.
Section III. The foregoing scheme, it may be said, presents a glo
|