e proposition, "The sun melts the snow," into the
form, "The sun is a-thing-which-melts-snow."
=Relation of Judgment to Conception.=--It would appear from the above
examples that a judgment expresses in an explicit form the relations
involved within the concept, and is, therefore, merely a direct way of
indicating the state of development of any idea. If my concept of a dog,
for example, is a synthesis of the qualities four-footed, hairy, fierce,
and barking, then an analysis of the concept will furnish the following
judgments:
{ A four-footed thing.
{ A hairy thing.
A dog is { A fierce thing.
{ A barking thing.
Because in these cases a concept seems necessary for an act of judgment,
it is said that judgment is a more advanced form of thinking than
conception. On the other hand, however, judgment is implied in the
formation of a concept. When the child apprehends the dog as a
four-footed object, his mind has grasped four-footedness as a quality
pertaining to the strange object, and has, in a sense, brought the two
ideas into relation. But while judgment is implied in the formation of
the concept, the concept does not bring explicitly to the mind the
judgments it implies. The concept snow, for instance, implies the
property of whiteness, but whiteness must be apprehended as a distinct
idea and related mentally with the idea snow before we can be said to
have formed, or thought, the judgment, "Snow is white." Judgment is a
form of thinking separate from conception, therefore, because it does
thus bring into definite relief relations only implied in our general
notions, or concepts. One value of judgment is, in fact, that it enables
us to analyse our concepts, and thus note more explicitly the relations
included in them.
=Universal and Particular Judgments.=--Judgments are found to differ
also as to the universality of their affirmation. In such a judgment as
"Man is mortal," since mortality is viewed as a quality always joined to
manhood, the affirmation is accepted as a universal judgment. In such a
judgment as "Men strive to subdue the air," the two objects of thought
are not considered as always and necessarily joined together. The
judgment is therefore particular in character. All of our laws of
nature, as "Air has weight," "Pressure on liquids is transmitted in
every direction," or "Heat is conducted by metals," are accepted as
universal judgments.
=Errors in Judgme
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