e and inductive reasoning
follow to some degree a systematic form. For this reason it may be
assumed that the practice of these forms should have some effect in
giving control of the processes. The child, for instance, who habituates
himself to such thought processes as AB equals BC, and AC equals BC,
therefore AB equals AC, no doubt becomes able thereby to grasp such
relations more easily. Granting so much, however, it is still evident
that close attention to, and accurate knowledge of, the various terms
involved in the reasoning process is the sure foundation of correct
reasoning.

CHAPTER XXIX

FEELING

=Sensuous and Ideal Feeling.=--We have noted (Chapter XXIV), that in
addition to the general feeling tone accompanying an act of attention,
and already described as a feeling of interest, there are two important
classes of feeling known respectively as sensuous and ideal feeling.
When a person says: "I feel tired" or "I feel hungry," he is referring
to the feeling side of certain organic sensations. When he says: "The
air feels cold" or "The paper feels smooth," he is referring to the
feeling side of temperature and touch sensations. These are, therefore,
examples of sensuous feeling. On the other hand, to say "I feel angry"
or "I feel afraid," is to refer to a feeling state which accompanies
perhaps the perception of some object, the recollection or anticipation
of some act, or the inference that something is sure to happen, etc.
These latter states are therefore known as ideal feelings.

=Quality of Feeling States.=--The qualities of our various feeling
states are distinguished under two heads, pleasure and pain. It might
seem at first sight that our feeling states will fall into a much larger
number of classes distinguished by differences in quality, or tone. The
taste of an orange, the smell of lavender, the touch of a hot stove, the
appreciation of a fine piece of music, and the appreciation of a lofty
poem, seem at first sight to yield different feelings. The supposed
difference in the quality of the feelings is due, however, to a
difference in the knowledge elements accompanying the feelings, or to
the fact that they are discriminated as different experiences. The idea
of the music or the poem is of a higher grade than the sensory image of
taste, and accordingly the feelings _appear_ to be different. The
feelings may, of course, differ in intensity, but in _quality_ they are
either pleasant or unpl