er of being swayed by his feelings. Our
likes and dislikes, in other words, interfere with our thinking, and
prevent us from analysing our knowledge as we should. Instead,
therefore, of striving to develop true concepts concerning men and
events and basing our judgments upon these, we are inclined in many
cases to allow our judgments to be swayed by mere feeling.

=C. Laziness.=--Indifference is likewise a common source of faulty
judgments. To attend to the concept and discover its intension as a
means for correct judgment evidently demands mental effort. Many people,
however, prefer either to jump at conclusions or let others do their
judging for them.

=Sound Judgments Based on Scientific Concepts.=--To be able to form
correct judgments regarding the members of any class, however, the child
should know, not only its common characteristics, but also the essential
features which distinguish its members from those of co-ordinate
classes. To know adequately the equilateral triangle, for instance, the
pupil must know both the features which distinguish it from other
triangles and also those in which it agrees with all triangles. To know
fully the mentha family of plants, he must know both the characteristic
qualities of the family and also those of the larger genus labiatae.
From this it will be seen that a large share of school work must be
devoted to building up scientific class notions in the minds of the
pupils. Without this, many of their judgments must necessarily be
faulty. To form such scientific concepts, however, it is necessary to
relate one concept with another in more indirect ways than is done
through the formation of judgments. This brings us to a consideration of
_reasoning_, the third and last form of thinking.

REASONING

=Nature of Reasoning.=--Reasoning is defined as a mental process in
which the mind arrives at a new judgment by comparing other judgments.
The mind, for instance, is in possession of the two judgments, "Stones
are heavy" and "Flint is a stone." By bringing these two judgments under
the eye of attention and comparing them, the mind is able to arrive at
the new judgment, "Flint is heavy." Here the new judgment, expressing a
relation between the notions, _flint_ and _heavy_, is supposed to be
arrived at, neither by direct experience, nor by an immediate analysis
of the concept _flint_, but more indirectly by comparing the other
judgments. The judgment, or conclusion, is said, therefor