review of Berkeley's theory,
which appeared in _Blackwood's Magazine_ of June 1842, was one of these
attempts. Had the author merely attacked or controverted our
animadversions on his book, we should probably have left the question to
its fate, and not have reverted to a subject, the discussion of which,
even in the first instance, may have been deemed out of place in a
journal not expressly philosophical. There is, in general, little to be
gained by protracting such controversies. But, as Mr Bailey accuses us,
in the present instance, of having misrepresented his views, we must be
allowed to exculpate ourselves from the charge of having dealt, even
with unintentional unfairness, towards one whose opinions, however much
we may dissent from them, are certainly entitled to high respect and a
candid examination, as the convictions of an able and zealous enquirer
after truth.
In our strictures on Mr Bailey's work, we remarked, that he had
represented Berkeley as holding that the eye is not directly and
originally cognizant of the outness of objects in relation to each
other, or of what we would call their reciprocal outness; in other
words, we stated, that, according to Mr Bailey, Berkeley must be
regarded as denying to the eye the original intuition of space, either
in length, breadth, or solid depth. It was, however, only in reference
to one of his arguments, and to one particular division of his subject,
that we laid this representation to his charge. Throughout the other
parts of his discussion, we by no means intended to say that such was
the view he took of the Berkeleian theory. Nor are we aware of having
made any statement to that effect. If we did, we now take the
opportunity of remarking, that we restrict our allegation, as we believe
we formerly restricted it, to the single argument and distinction just
mentioned, and hereafter to be explained.
In his reply, Mr Bailey disavows the impeachment _in toto_. He declares
that he never imputed to Berkeley the doctrine, that the eye is not
directly percipient of space in the two dimensions of length and
breadth. "The perception of this kind of distance," says he, "never
formed the subject of controversy with any one ... That we see extension
in two dimensions is admitted by all."--(_Letter_, p. 10.) If it can be
shown that the doctrine which is here stated to be admitted by all
philosophers, is yet expressly controverted by the two metaphysicians
whom Mr Bailey appea
|