w disavows as his
interpretation of the bishop's opinion. He further disputes the
relevancy of the question about our perception of lateral extension, and
maintains that distance in a direction from the percipient, or what we
should call protensive distance, is the only matter in dispute; and that
it is a misconception of the scope of Berkeley's essay to imagine
otherwise. The relevancy of the question shall be disposed of
afterwards. In the mean time, the question at issue is, Can the
allegation which we have laid to Mr Bailey's charge be proved to be the
fact, or not?

[31] Mr Bailey seems disposed to carp at us for having confined
our remarks to this first question, and for not having given a
more complete review of his book. But the reason why we cut
short our critique is obvious; for if it be proved, as we
believe it can, that objects are originally seen at _no distance
whatever_ from the sight, it becomes quite superfluous to
enquire what appearance they would present if originally seen at
_some_ distance from the sight. The way in which we disposed of
the first question, however imperfect our treatment of it may
have been, necessarily prevented us from entering upon the
second; and our review, with all its deficiencies, was thus a
complete review of his book, though not a review of his complete
book.

In discussing the first of the two questions, it was quite possible for
Mr Bailey to have represented Berkeley as holding, that visible objects,
though not seen to be external to the sight, were yet seen to be out of
each other, or laterally extended within the organism or the mind. But
Mr Bailey makes no such representation of the theory, and the whole
argument which pervades the chapter in which the first question is
discussed, is founded on the negation of any such extension. All visible
extension, he tells us, must, in his opinion, be either plane or solid.
Now he will scarcely maintain that he regarded Berkeley as holding that
we perceive solid extension within the organism of the eye. Neither does
he admit that, according to Berkeley, and in reference to this first
question, plane extension is perceived within the organism of the eye.
For when he proceeds to the discussion of the _second_ of the two
questions, he remarks that "we must, _at this stage_ of the argument,
consider the theory under examination, as representing that we see all
things _originally