sphere of the other also. Perhaps, strictly
speaking, it is wrong to say that these objects are apprehended as
internal to the sight; for the conception of internality implies the
conception of externality, and neither of these conceptions can, as yet,
be realized. But it is obvious what the expression _internal_ means; and
it is unobjectionable, when understood to signify that the Seeing Power,
the Seeing Act, and the Seen Things, co-exist in a synthesis in which
there is no interval or discrimination. For, suppose that we know
instinctively that the seen things occupy a locality separate from the
sight. But that implies that we instinctively know that the sight
occupies a locality separate from them. But such a supposition is a
falling back upon the notion just reprobated, that the mere act of
seeing can indicate its own organ, or can localise the visual phenomena
in the eye--a position which, we presume, no philosopher will be hardy
enough to maintain, when called upon to do so, broadly and
unequivocally. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible, that, in mere
vision, the sight and its objects cling together in a union or
synthesis, which no function of that sense, and no knowledge imparted to
us by it, (and, according to the supposition, we have, as yet, no other
knowledge,) can enable us to discriminate or dissolve. Where the seeing
is, there is the thing seen, and where the thing seen is, there is the
seeing of it.

But man is not a mere seeing animal. He has other senses besides: He
has, for example, the sense of touch, and one of the most important
offices which this sense performs, is to break up the identity or
cohesion which subsists between sight and its objects. And how? We
answer, by teaching us to associate _vision in general_, or the abstract
_condition_ regulating our visual impressions, with the presence of the
small tangible body we call the eye, and _vision in particular_, or the
individual sensations of vision, (i.e. colours,) with the presence of
immeasurably larger bodies revealed to us by touch, and tangibly
external to the tangible eye. Sight, as we have said, does not inform us
that its sensations are situated in the eye: it does not inform us that
we have an eye at all. Neither does touch inform us that our visual
sensations are located in the eye. It does not lead us to associate with
the eye any of the visual phenomena or operations _in the first
instance_. If it did, it would (_firstly_)