pon the bishop. When we
open our eyes, what do we behold? We behold points--_minima
visibilia_--out of one another. Do we see these points to be in the same
plane? Certainly not. If they are in the same plane we learn this from a
very different experience from that of sight. Again, do we see these
points to be _not_ in the same plane? Certainly not. If the points are
not in the same plane we learn this, too, from a very different
experience than that of sight. All that we see is that the points are
out of one another; and this simply implies the perception of extension,
without implying the perception either of plane or of solid extension.
Thus by the observation of a very obvious fact, which, however, Mr
Bailey has overlooked, is Berkeley's assertion that visible objects are
apprehended as extended, and yet not apprehended either as planes or
solids, relieved from every appearance of contradiction.

It must, however, be admitted that Mr Bailey has much to justify him in
his opinion that extension must be apprehended either as plane or as
solid. None of Berkeley's followers, we believe, have ever dreamt of
conceiving it otherwise, and finding in their master's work the negation
of solid extension specially insisted on, they leapt to the conclusion
that the bishop admitted the original perception of plane extension. But
Berkeley makes no such admission. He places the perception of plane
extension on precisely the same footing with that of solid extension.
"We see planes," says he, "in the same way that we see solids."[35] And
the wisdom of the averment is obvious; for the affirmation of plane
extension involves the negation of solid extension, but this negation
involves the conception (visually derived) of solid extension; but the
admission of that conception, so derived, would be fatal to the
Berkeleian theory. Therefore its author wisely avoids the danger by
holding, that in vision we have merely the perception of what the
Germans would call the _Auseinanderseyn_, that is, the _asunderness_, of
things--a perception which implies no judgment as to whether the things
are secerned in plane or in protensive space.

[35] Essay, Sec. 158.

With regard to the supposition that, in order to preserve Berkeley's
consistency, it was necessary for him to teach that our visual
sensations, (colours namely,) being internal feelings, could involve the
perception neither of plane nor of solid extension, that is to say, of
no exte