id, Mr Bailey, entertaining the
notions he does on the subject of extension, _must_ regard him as
holding that they cannot be apprehended as extended at all--and
accordingly such is the express representation he gives of the theory in
the passage just quoted, where he says that "the doctrine of Berkeley,
which affirms that the figures we see are neither plane nor solid, (that
is, are extended in _no_ direction, according to Mr Bailey's ideas of
extension,) appears to him to be _a part_ of the doctrine which asserts
that visible objects are only internal feelings." Now if that be not
teaching, in the plainest terms, that, according to Berkeley, no species
of extension is implied in the internal feelings of vision, we know not
what language means, and any one thought may be identical with its very
opposite.

[33] Ibid. p. 136.

Here we might let the subject drop, having, as we conceive, said quite
enough to prove the truth of our allegation that, in reference to the
first question discussed, in which our original visual sensations are
represented by Berkeley to be mere internal feelings, Mr Bailey
understood and stated those feelings to signify sensations in which no
perception of extension whatever was involved. However, as Mr Bailey
further remarks that, "although Berkeley's doctrine about visible
figures being neither plane not solid, is thus consistent with his
assertion that they are internal feelings, it is in itself
contradictory,"[34] we shall contribute a few remarks to show that
while, on the one hand, the negation of extension is not required to
vindicate the consistency of Berkeley's assertion, that visible objects
are internal feelings, neither, on the other hand, is there any
contradiction in Berkeley's holding that objects are not seen either as
planes or as solids, and are yet apprehended as extended. Mr Bailey
alleges that we are "far more successful in involving ourselves in
subtle speculations of our own, than in faithfully guiding our readers
through the theories of other philosophers." Perhaps in the present case
we shall be able to thread a labyrinth where our reviewer has lost his
clue, and, in spite of the apparent contradiction by which Mr Bailey has
been gravelled, we shall, perhaps, be more successful than he in
"collecting Berkeley's meaning from the whole sum and tenour of his
discourse."

[34] Review of Berkeley's Theory, p. 137.

First, with regard to the contradiction charged u