in the same plane_,"[32] obviously implying that he
had not _as yet_ considered the theory as representing that we see
things originally in the same plane: in other words, plainly admitting
that, in his treatment of the first question, he had not regarded the
theory as representing that we see things originally under the category
of extension at all.

[32] Review of Berkeley's Theory, p 35.

But if any more direct evidence on this point were wanted, it is to be
found in the section of his work which treats of "the perception of
figure." In the chapter in which he discusses the first of the two
questions, he constantly speaks of Berkeley's theory as representing
that "our visual sensations, or what we ultimately term visible objects,
are originally mere internal feelings." The expression _mere internal
feelings_, however, is ambiguous; for, as we have said, it might still
imply that Mr Bailey viewed the theory as representing that there was an
extension, or reciprocal outness of objects within the retina. But this
doubt is entirely removed by a passage in the section alluded to, which
proves that, in Mr Bailey's estimation, these mere internal feelings not
only involve no such extension, but that there would be an inconsistency
in supposing they did. In this section he brings forward Berkeley's
assertion, "that neither solid nor plane figures are immediate objects
of sight." He then quotes a passage in which the bishop begs the reader
not to stickle too much "about this or that phrase, or manner of
expression, but candidly to collect his meaning from the whole sum and
tenour of his discourse." And then Mr Bailey goes on to say,
"endeavouring, in the spirit here recommended, to collect the author's
meaning when he affirms that the figures we see are neither plane nor
solid, it appears to me to be _a part or consequence_ of his doctrine
already examined, which asserts that visible objects are only internal
feelings."[33] We can now be at no loss to understand what Mr Bailey
means, and conceives Berkeley to mean, by the expression "mere internal
feelings." He evidently means feelings in which no kind of extension
whatever is involved: for, in the next page, he informs us that all
visual extension or extended figure, "_must_ be apprehended as either
plane or solid, and that it is impossible even to conceive it
otherwise." Consequently, if the figures we see are, as Berkeley says,
apprehended neither as plane nor as sol