ary, operating upon the acts of
individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not; [whereas]
under the Fourteenth [Amendment], * * * it * * * can only be, corrective
in its character, addressed to counteract and afford relief against
State regulations or proceedings."[21]
Pursuant to its powers of enforcement under section two of this
amendment, Congress on March 2, 1867 enacted a statute[22] by the terms
of which the system of peonage was abolished and prohibited and
penalties were imposed on anyone who holds, arrests, or returns, or
causes, or aids in the arrest or return of a person to peonage. The
validity of this act was sustained in Clyatt _v._ United States;[23] and
more recently, in United States _v._ Gaskin,[24] a proviso thereof was
construed as capable of supporting a conviction for arrest with intent
to compel performance of labor even though the debtor in fact rendered
no service after his arrest. Each of the acts enumerated in that
proviso, the "holding, arresting, or the returning, may be the subject
of indictment and punishment."
Notes
[1] Bailey _v._ Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 240 (1911).
[2] 16 Wall. 36 (1873).
[3] Ibid. 69, 71-72.
[4] 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
[5] Ibid. 16-17.
[6] Pursuant to its enforcement powers under section 2 of this
amendment, Congress, on March 2, 1867 adopted a statute (14 Stat. 546),
which is now found in 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 56 and 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1581, by
the terms of which peonage was prohibited, and persons returning any one
to a condition of peonage were subjected to criminal punishment. This
statute was upheld in Clyatt _v._ United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
[7] Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (1903).
[8] 219 U.S. 219 (1911). Justice Holmes, who was joined by Justice
Lurton, dissented on the ground that a State was not forbidden by this
amendment from punishing a breach of contract as a crime. "Compulsory
work for no private master in a jail is not peonage."--Ibid. 247.
[9] Ibid. 244.
[10] 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
[11] 315 U.S. 25 (1942).
[12] 322 U.S. 4 (1944). Justice Reed, with Chief Justice Stone
concurring, contended in a dissenting opinion that a State is not
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment from "punishing the fraudulent
procurement of an advance in wages."--Ibid. 27.
[13] Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-25 (1883); Plessy _v._ Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
[14] Hodges _v._ United States; 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
[15] Robertson _v
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