ccur unless the case presents, clearly and beyond all doubt, such a
flagrant attack upon the rights of property under the guise of
regulation as to compel the court to say that the rates prescribed will
necessarily have the effect to deny just compensation for private
property taken for the public use." And in a similar later case[208] the
Court expressed even more clearly its reluctance to reexamine factual
determinations of the kind just described. The Court is not bound "to
reexamine and weigh all the evidence, * * *, or to proceed according to
* * * [its] independent opinion as to what are proper rates. It is
enough if * * * [the Court] cannot say that it was impossible for a
fair-minded board to come to the result which was reached."

Moreover, in reviewing orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Court, at least in earlier years,[209] chose to be guided by
approximately the same standards of appraisal as it had originally
formulated for examining regulations of State commissions; and inasmuch
as the following excerpt from its holding in Interstate Commerce
Commission _v._ Union Pacific R. Co.[210] represents an adequate
summation of the law as it stood prior to 1920, it is set forth below:
"* * * questions of fact may be involved in the determination of
questions of law, so that an order, regular on its face, may be set
aside if it appears that the rate is so low as to be confiscatory * * *;
or if the Commission acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates
contrary to evidence, or without evidence to support it; or if the
authority therein involved has been exercised in such an unreasonable
manner as to cause it to be within the elementary rule that the
substance, and not the shadow, determines the validity of the exercise
of the power. * * * In determining these mixed questions of law and
fact, the Court confines itself to the ultimate question as to whether
the Commission acted within its power. It will not consider the
expediency or wisdom of the order, or whether, on like testimony, it
would have made a similar ruling. * * * [The Commission's] conclusion,
of course, is subject to review, but when supported by evidence is
accepted as final; not that its decision, * * *, can be supported by a
mere scintilla of proof--but the courts will not examine the facts
further than to determine whether there was substantial evidence to
sustain the order."

The Ben Avon Case

These standards of review wer