all,"
is an incident of State rather than United States citizenship.[52]
(18) Statute allowing a State to appeal in criminal cases for errors of
law and to retry the accused.[53]
(19) Statute making the payment of poll taxes a prerequisite to the
right to vote.[54]
(20) Statute whereby deposits in banks outside the State are taxed at
50c per $100 and deposits in banks within the State are taxed at 10c per
$100. "* * * the right to carry out an incident to a trade, business or
calling such as the deposit of money in banks is not a privilege of
national citizenship."[55]
(21) The right to become a candidate for State office is a privilege of
State citizenship, not national citizenship.[56]
(22) The Illinois Election Code which requires that a petition to form
and nominate candidates for a new political party be signed by at least
200 voters from each of at least 50 of the 102 counties in the State,
notwithstanding that 52% of the voters reside in only one county and
87%, in the 49 most populous counties.[57]
Due Process of Law Clause
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Although many years after ratification the Court ventured the not very
informative observation that the Fourteenth Amendment "operates to
extend * * * the same protection against arbitrary State legislation,
affecting life, liberty and property, as is offered by the Fifth
Amendment,"[58] and that "ordinarily if an act of Congress is valid
under the Fifth Amendment it would be hard to say that a State law in
like terms was void under the Fourteenth,"[59] the significance of the
due process clause as a restraint on State action appears to have been
grossly underestimated by litigants no less than by the Court in the
years immediately following its adoption. From the outset of our
constitutional history due process of law as it occurs in the Fifth
Amendment had been recognized as a restraint upon government, but, with
one conspicuous exception,[60] only in the narrower sense that a
legislature must provide "due process for the enforcement of law"; and
it was in accordance with this limited appraisal of the clause that the
Court disposed of early cases arising thereunder.
Thus, in the Slaughter-House Cases,[61] in which the clause was timidly
invoked by a group of butchers challenging on several grounds the
validity of a Louisiana statute which conferred upon one corporation the
exclusive privilege of butchering cattle in New Orleans, the Court
decl
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