acher to teach and "of parents to engage him so to instruct their
children." Although the Court did incorporate into its opinion in this
case the general definition of "liberty" set forth above, its holding
was substantially a reaffirmation of the liberty, in this instance of
the teacher, to pursue a lawful calling free and clear of arbitrary
restraints imposed by the State. In Pierce _v._ Society of the
Sisters,[119] the Court elaborated further upon the liberty of parents
when it declared that a State law requiring compulsory public school
education of children, aged eight to sixteen, "unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control."[120] As to a student,
neither his liberty to pursue his happiness nor his property or property
rights were infringed when he was denied admission to a State university
for refusing to comply with a law requiring renunciation of allegiance
to, or affiliation with, a Greek letter fraternity. The right to attend
such an institution was labelled, not an absolute, but a conditional
right; inasmuch as the school was wholly under the control of the State,
the latter was competent to enact measures such as the present one
regulating internal discipline thereat.[121] Similarly, "the Fourteenth
Amendment as a safeguard of 'liberty' [does not] confer the right to be
students in the State university free from obligation to take military
training as one of the conditions of attendance."[122]

Liberties Safeguarded by the First Eight Amendments.--In what
has amounted to a constitutional revolution, the Court, since the end of
World War I, has substantially enlarged the meaning of the term,
"liberty," appearing in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a consequence of this altered interpretation, States and
their local subdivisions have been restrained in their attempts to
interfere with the press, or with the freedom of speech, assembly, or
religious precepts of their inhabitants, and prevented from withholding
from persons charged with commission of a crime certain privileges
deemed essential to the enjoyment of a "fair trial." Cases revealing to
what extent there has been incorporated into the "liberty" of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the substance of the First
Amendment are set forth in the discussion presented under the latter
amendment; whereas the decisions indicating th