FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   1094   1095   1096   1097   1098   1099   1100   1101   1102   1103   1104   1105   1106   1107   1108   1109   1110   1111   1112   1113   1114   1115   1116   1117   1118  
1119   1120   1121   1122   1123   1124   1125   1126   1127   1128   1129   1130   1131   1132   1133   1134   1135   1136   1137   1138   1139   1140   1141   1142   1143   >>   >|  
ould invite judicial condemnation only if "arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt." The latter standard of judicial appraisal, as will be subsequently noted, represents less of a departure from the principle enunciated in the Munn Case than that which the Court evolved, in the years following 1877, to measure the validity of State imposed public utility rates, and this difference in the judicial treatment of prices and rates accordingly warrants an explanation at the outset. Unlike operators of public utilities who, in return for the grant of certain exclusive, virtually monopolistic privileges by the governmental unit enfranchising them, must assume an obligation to provide continuous service, proprietors of other businesses are in receipt of no similar special advantages and accordingly are unrestricted in the exercise of their right to liquidate and close their establishments. At liberty, therefore, as public utilities invariably are not, to escape, by dissolution, the consequences of publicly imposed charges deemed to be oppressive, owners of ordinary business, presumably for that reason, have thus far been unable to convince the courts that they too, no less than public utilities, are in need of that protection which judicial review affords. Consistently with its initial pronouncement in the Munn Case, that the reasonableness of compensation allowed under permissible rate regulation presented a legislative rather than a judicial question, the Court, in Davidson _v._ New Orleans,[191] also rejected the contention that, by virtue of the due process clause, businesses, even though subject to control of their prices or charges, were nevertheless entitled to "just compensation." Less than a decade was to elapse, however, before the Court, appalled perhaps by prospective consequences of leaving business "at the mercy of the majority of the legislature," began to reverse itself. Thus, in 1886, Chief Justice Waite, in the Railroad Commission Cases,[192] warned that "this power to regulate is not a power to destroy; [and] the State cannot do that in law which amounts to a taking of property for public use without just compensation or without due process of law"; or, in other words, cannot impose a confiscatory rate. By treating "due process of law" and "just compensation" as equivalents, the Court, contrary to its earlier holding in Davidson _v._ New Orleans, wa
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   1094   1095   1096   1097   1098   1099   1100   1101   1102   1103   1104   1105   1106   1107   1108   1109   1110   1111   1112   1113   1114   1115   1116   1117   1118  
1119   1120   1121   1122   1123   1124   1125   1126   1127   1128   1129   1130   1131   1132   1133   1134   1135   1136   1137   1138   1139   1140   1141   1142   1143   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

public

 

judicial

 
compensation
 

process

 

utilities

 

Davidson

 

consequences

 
business
 

charges

 

imposed


prices

 

businesses

 

Orleans

 

legislature

 
question
 

confiscatory

 

legislative

 

regulation

 

presented

 

impose


virtue

 

rejected

 
contention
 
equivalents
 
Consistently
 

affords

 
review
 

protection

 
initial
 
holding

property
 

permissible

 
contrary
 
allowed
 

pronouncement

 

reasonableness

 
earlier
 
treating
 

clause

 
majority

warned

 

regulate

 

prospective

 

leaving

 

reverse

 

Justice

 
Railroad
 

Commission

 
appalled
 

subject