as succinct and inclusive as any other we might devise at
this time. It takes into consideration those factors which we deem
relevant, and relates their significances. More we cannot expect from
words. Likewise, we are in accord with the court below, which affirmed
the trial court's finding that the requisite danger existed. The mere
fact that from the period 1945 to 1948 petitioners' activities did not
result in an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence
is of course no answer to the fact that there was a group that was ready
to make the attempt. The formation by petitioners of such a highly
organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call
when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had come for
action, coupled with the inflammable nature of world conditions, similar
uprisings in other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our
relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least
ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were justified
on this score. And this analysis disposes of the contention that a
conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished from the advocacy itself,
cannot be constitutionally restrained, because it comprises only the
preparation. It is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the
danger."[216] His final position seems to be that, after all, the
question is one for judicial discretion. "When facts are found that
establish the violation of a statute, the protection against conviction
afforded by the First Amendment is a matter of law. The doctrine that
there must be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent is a judicial rule to be applied as a
matter of law by the courts."[217]

Justice Frankfurter's lengthy concurring opinion premises "the right of
a government to maintain its existence--self preservation." This, he
says, is "the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty," citing The
Federalist No. 41, and certain cases.[218] A little later he raises the
question, "But how are competing interests to be assessed?" and answers:
"Full responsibility for the choice cannot be given to the courts.
Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good
reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and
therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality
is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches that the
indep