ege'_ (Columbia Univ. Press,
1924)." Edward S. Corwin, _Liberty Against Government_. 157-159 fn.
(L.S.U. Press, 1948).
[71] Patterson _v._ Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
[72] Ibid. 461
[73] Prudential Ins. Co. _v._ Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
[74] Schenck _v._ United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); and _see_ below.
[Transcriber's Note: Reference is to Footnote 75, below.]
[75] _See_ Justice Brandeis concurring opinion in Whitney _v._
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); and cases reviewed below.
[76] Fiske _v._ Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
[77] 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
[78] Ibid. 341-342.
[79] 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
[80] Fiske _v._ Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
[81] Stromberg _v._ California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
[82] De Jonge _v._ Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
[83] 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
[84] 40 Stat. 217, 219.
[85] 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
[86] 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919).
[87] 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
[88] Ibid. 206.
[89] 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
[90] Ibid. 215-216.
[91] 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
[92] Ibid. 627. It should be noted that Justice Holmes couples with his
invocation of the clear and present danger test in his dissent in this
case the contention that rightly construed the act of Congress involved
(The Espionage Act of May 16, 1918; 40 Stat. 553) required that
defendant's intent be specifically proved. He wrote: "I am aware of
course that the word intent as vaguely used in ordinary legal discussion
means no more than knowledge at the time of the act that the
consequences said to be intended will ensue. Even less than that will
satisfy the general principle of civil and criminal liability. A man may
have to pay damages, may be sent to prison, at common law might be
hanged, if at the time of his act he knew facts from which common
experience showed that the consequences would follow, whether he
individually could foresee them or not. But, when words are used
exactly, a deed is not done with intent to produce a consequence unless
that consequence is the aim of the deed. It may be obvious, and obvious
to the actor, that the consequence will follow, and he may be liable for
it even if he regrets it, but he does not do the act with intent to
produce it unless to aim to produce it is the proximate motive of the
specific act, although there may be some deeper motive behind. It seems
to me that this statute must be taken to use its words in a strict and
accurate sense." 250 U.S. at 626-
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