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627. In the Holmes-Pollock Letters this is the main point discussed by the two correspondents regarding the Abrams Case; the clear and present danger doctrine is not mentioned. 2 Holmes-Pollock Letters, 29, 31, 32, 42, 44-45, 48, 65. [93] 251 U.S. 466 (1920). [94] Ibid. 479. _See also_ to the same effect: Pierce _v._ United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920). [95] 268 U.S. 652 (1925). [96] Ibid. 668, 669. [97] Ibid. 670. [98] Ibid. 671. Justice Holmes presented a dissenting opinion for himself and Justice Brandeis which contains a curious note of fatalism. He said: "If what I think the correct test is applied, it is manifest that there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by force on the part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defendant's views. It is said that this Manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief, and, if believed, it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it, or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us, it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If, in the long run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way." Ibid. 673. [99] 274 U.S. 357 (1927). [100] Ibid. 373, 377. Apparently this means that the ultimate test of the constitutionality of legislation restricting freedom of utterance is whether there is still sufficient time to educate the utterers out of their mistaken frame of mind, and the final say on this necessarily recondite matter rests with the Supreme Court! Justice Brandeis also asserts (274 U.S. at 376) that there is a distinction between "advocacy" and "incitement," but fails to adduce any supporting authority. [101] 301 U.S. 242 (1937). [102] Ibid. 261-263. [103] 310 U.S. 88 (1940). [104] Ibid. 105. [105] Cantwell _v._ Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). [106] Stromberg _v._ California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). [107] Fox _v._ Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915). [108] Gitlow _v._ New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
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