roper to refuse to issue a permit. Two Justices held that in the
circumstances of the case the ordinance violated the right of certain
citizens of the United States to assemble to discuss certain privileges
which they enjoyed as such, to wit, their rights and privileges under
the National Labor Relations Act.[254] Said Justice Roberts, expressing
this point of view: "The privilege of a citizen of the United States to
use the streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute,
but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order;
but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. We
think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note
1 void upon its face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use
of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the
Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such
refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' It
can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary
suppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the
prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such
eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege
cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection
with the exercise of the right."[255] Two other Justices invoked also
the due process clause of Amendment XIV, thereby claiming the right of
assembly for aliens as well as citizens. Said Justice Stone, who
expressed this view: "I think respondents' right to maintain it does not
depend on their citizenship and cannot rightly be made to turn on the
existence or non-existence of a purpose to disseminate information about
the National Labor Relations Act. It is enough that petitioners have
prevented respondents from holding meetings and disseminating
information whether for the organization of labor unions or for any
other lawful purpose."[256] Both Justices were in agreement that freedom
of speech and freedom of assembly were claimable only by natural
persons, and not by corporations.[257] Two Justices dissented on the
basis of Davis _v._ Massachusetts.[258]
RECENT CASES
In Bridges _v._ California[259] it was held that a telegram addressed to
the Secretary of Labor strongly criticizing
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