nificant that the cases which have sanctioned previous
restraints upon the utterances of particular persons have involved
restraint by judicial, not administrative action. The prime objective of
the ban on previous restraints was to outlaw censorship accomplished by
licensing. "The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily
directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power
that John Milton directed his assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of
Unlicensed Printing.' And the liberty of the press became initially a
right to publish '_without_ a license what formerly could be published
only _with one_'."[164] Even today, a licensing requirement will bring
judicial condemnation more surely than any other form of restriction.
Except where the authority of the licensing officer is so closely
limited as to leave no room for discrimination against utterances he
does not approve,[165] the Supreme Court has struck down licensing
ordinances, even in respect of a form of communication which may be
prohibited entirely.[166] In the case of radio broadcasting, however,
where physical limitations make it impossible for everyone to utilize
the medium of communication, the Court has thus far sanctioned a power
of selective licensing;[167] while with respect to moving pictures it
has until very recently held the States' power to license, and hence to
censor, films intended for local exhibition to be substantially
unrestricted, this being "a business pure and simple, originated and
conducted for profit," and "not to be regarded, ... as part of the press
of the country or as organs of public opinion."[168] This doctrine was
laid down in 1915, but in 1948, in speaking for the Court, in United
States _v._ Paramount Pictures,[169] Justice Douglas indicated a very
different position, saying: "We have no doubt that moving pictures,
like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is
guaranteed by the First Amendment."[170] In the so-called "Miracle
Case,"[171] in which it was held that under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, a State may not place a prior restraint on the showing of a
motion picture film on the basis of the censor's finding that it is
"sacrilegious," a word of uncertain connotation, this point of view
becomes the doctrine of the Court and the Mutual Films Case is
pronounced "overruled" so far as it is out of harmony with the instant
holding.[172]

THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TES