on this occasion, Justice
Frankfurter asserted that "utterance in a context of violence can lose
its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument
of force * * * (and) was not meant to be sheltered by the
Constitution."[122]

For a brief period strangers to the employer were accorded an almost
equal freedom of communication by means of picketing.[123] Subsequent
cases, however, have recognized that "while picketing has an ingredient
of communication it cannot dogmatically be equated with the
constitutionally protected freedom of speech."[124] Without dissent the
Court has held that a State may enjoin picketing designed to coerce the
employer to violate State law by refusing to sell ice to nonunion
peddlers,[125] by interfering with the right of his employees to decide
whether or not to join a union,[126] or by choosing a specified
proportion of his employees from one race, irrespective of merit.[127]
By close divisions, it also sustained the right of a State to forbid the
"conscription of neutrals" by the picketing of a restaurant solely
because the owner had contracted for the erection of a building (not
connected with the restaurant and located some distance away) by a
contractor who employed nonunion men;[128] or the picketing of a shop
operated by the owner without employees to induce him to observe certain
closing hours.[129] In this last case Justice Black distinguished
Thornhill _v._ Alabama and other prior cases by saying, "No opinions
relied on by petitioners assert a constitutional right in picketers to
take advantage of speech or press to violate valid laws designed to
protect important interests of society * * * it has never been deemed an
abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.
* * * Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties
of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce
laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other
agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society."[130] By the
same token, a State anti-closed shop law does not infringe freedom of
speech, of assembly or of petition;[131] neither does a "cease and
desist" order of a State Labor Relations Board directed against work
stoppages caused by the calling of special union meetings du