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the duty, to determine the matter according to its own ideas of what is expedient, that Madison has been most completely vindicated by developments. This is seen in the answer which the Court has returned to the question, as to what happens when a treaty provision and an act of Congress conflict. The answer is, that neither has any intrinsic superiority over the other and that therefore the one of later date will prevail _leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant_. In short, the treaty commitments of the United States in no wise diminish Congress's constitutional powers. To be sure, legislative repeal of a treaty as law of the land may amount to a violation of it as an international contract in the judgment of the other party to it. In such case, as the Court has said, "Its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress."[172] TREATIES _Versus_ PRIOR ACTS OF CONGRESS The cases are numerous in which the Court has enforced statutory provisions which were recognized by it as superseding prior treaty engagements. How as to the converse situation? Two early cases in which Chief Justice Marshall spoke for the Court, stand for the proposition that treaties, so far as self-executing, repeal earlier conflicting acts of Congress. In the case of the "_Peggy_,"[173] certain statutory provisions dealing with the trial of prize cases were held to have been modified by a subsequent treaty with France; and in Foster _v._. Neilson,[174] while holding--mistakenly as he later admitted[175]--that the treaty of January 24, 1818 with Spain was not self-executing with respect to certain land grants, he went on to say that if it had been it would have repealed acts of Congress repugnant to it. With one exception, however, judicial dicta which reiterate this idea are obiter, and are disparaged by Willoughby, as follows: "In fact, however, there have been few (the writer is not certain that there have been any) instances in which a treaty inconsistent with a prior act of Congress has been given full force and effect as law in this country without the assent of Congress. There may indeed have been cases in which, by treaty, certain action has been taken without reference to existing Federal laws, as, for example
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